China and the Fentanyl Crisis: Challenges and Implications for Latin America
The growing expansion of fentanyl trafficking presents emerging challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean—not only due to the potential increase in domestic consumption, which remains limited for now, but also because the region is consolidating its role as a critical logistical node within global drug trafficking routes. The illicit production of this synthetic opioid depends largely on chemical precursors sourced from China, where numerous companies—despite formal regulatory frameworks—continue to export these substances to North America through a variety of channels. In Mexico, criminal organizations have developed significant technical and operational capacities to synthesize and distribute fentanyl, primarily for the U.S. market. While recent bilateral agreements between China and the United States have sought to limit specific chemical exports, persistent regulatory and enforcement shortcomings hamper effective control. Although fentanyl production remains concentrated in Mexico, the growing influence of transnational criminal networks across the region—combined with the expansion of strategic infrastructure, such as the deep-water port of Chancay in Peru—poses mounting risks to regional security.
The fentanyl crisis is gaining increasing relevance in Latin America and the Caribbean, primarily due to the growing influx of chemical precursors from China, trafficked by criminal operators in Mexico who are responsible for the manufacture and distribution of this synthetic opioid to the United States. Although domestic consumption has not yet reached critical levels in most countries of the region, authorities remain on alert due to its extreme lethality and the potential expansion of the market in the coming years—particularly as the regulation and control of chemical precursors originating in Asia continues to pose a challenge.
Since 2012, China has played a significant role in the fentanyl crisis as the main supplier of a wide range of chemical precursors used not only for the production of this opioid but also for other synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine. It is estimated that at least 188 Chinese pharmaceutical companies, particularly based in the provinces of Hebei and Hubei, manufacture essential precursors and pre-precursors required for fentanyl synthesis. Several of these firms have been linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), operating under the protection of influential figures seeking financial backing to climb the party hierarchy—an alliance often referred to as the ‘Red Mafia‘.
“Since 2012, China has played a significant role in the fentanyl crisis as the main supplier of key chemical precursors used to produce this opioid and other synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine.”
The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), under CCP control, maintains a strict anti-drug policy across Southeast Asia and the Pacific. However, its law enforcement cooperation is often selective, politically motivated, and subordinated to its broader geopolitical interests. As a result, regulatory measures addressing the fentanyl crisis tend to lack transparency and are instead aligned with a broader hybrid warfare doctrine, where the global drug trade is seen as a strategic instrument to advance national objectives.
Although in May 2019 the Chinese government added all fentanyl-related substances and two key precursors to its list of banned narcotics, the restriction was limited to the final product, allowing for the continued manufacture and export of precursor chemicals essential to fentanyl production. According to the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, the PRC has provided direct subsidies to companies involved in drug trafficking while consistently evading investigative actions necessary to penalize firms openly marketing these precursors online.
“The PRC government provides direct subsidies to companies linked to drug trafficking, while avoiding investigative actions needed to sanction firms that openly offer these precursors online.”
Indeed, investigations have revealed that a network of chemical companies uses multiple websites as sales platforms to offer semi-finished products, effectively bypassing Chinese legal restrictions. These precursors, which require additional processing to become the final drug product, allow some chemical firms to operate under a façade of legality. A notable example, as reported by InSight Crime, is MicroDroper, a China-based company that operated both on the open web and the dark web, offering a broad catalogue of chemicals vital to fentanyl production. This company was found to have ties with another Chinese firm, The Grateful Chemicals (TGC-RC Chemicals), which also marketed a wide variety of precursor substances using encrypted codes accessible to virtually any buyer. Other firms went further by facilitating international shipping and offering detailed recipes for synthesizing this synthetic opioid, which is up to 50 times more potent than heroin.
Regarding the fentanyl supply chain, both independent buyers and criminal organizations in Mexico acquire precursor substances such as N-(tert-butoxycarbonyl)-4-piperidone, which is frequently used by Mexican cartels to produce synthetic drugs. These are then distributed to wholesale networks in the United States through various transport routes involving both legal and illegal actors embedded in a much more complex trafficking system.
In August 2024, the administration of former U.S. President Joe Biden announced an agreement with China to impose new controls on the production of key chemical ingredients used in fentanyl synthesis. In response, the Chinese government stated that, beginning September 1, three chemical components—4-AP, 1-boc, and norfentanyl—would be subject to regulatory control. “China has always attached great importance to international cooperation in the fight against drugs and is willing to work with countries around the world, including the United States,” said Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington.
Nevertheless, skepticism remains regarding the effectiveness of these new regulations. In his research, John Coyne—an expert on illicit drug markets at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute—notes that numerous precursors remain unregulated in China, and points to evidence of complicity among Chinese officials in the fentanyl trade. “There are links between some of these chemical companies and Chinese government officials—in fact, they advertise those links online,” Coyne stated.
Other analysts argue that even if China succeeds in tightening regulatory controls, halting the flow of precursor chemicals may prove nearly impossible. Jonathan Caulkins, a fentanyl crisis expert at Carnegie Mellon University, asserts that these precursors are relatively simple to synthesize and widely available, making it extremely difficult to regulate all compounds capable of producing synthetic opioids. Similarly, Greg Midgette, a drug market specialist at the University of Maryland, emphasizes that tracing and blocking the sources of these chemicals presents a monumental challenge. “We would likely see shifts in production within China or in other countries where chemical precursors are less tightly regulated,” he warns.
“There are links between some of these chemical companies and Chinese government officials; in fact, they advertise those links online,” said John Coyne of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
In Latin America and the Caribbean—excluding the illicit production of fentanyl by Mexico’s Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels for export to the U.S.—most seizures of this opioid have involved isolated cases of diversion from medical or hospital centers for illegal distribution. Such incidents have occurred in countries including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela. Nevertheless, the growing presence of criminal networks linked to Mexican cartels across the region—facilitating the distribution of precursors and the synthesis of fentanyl—continues to represent a latent threat amid a potential rise in local consumption in the coming years.
Although regional drug use patterns differ from the opioid crisis experienced in Canada and the United States—where the epidemic was driven by the overprescription of opioids for pain and chronic illness since the 1990s—some independent producers in Mexico may adapt to emerging methods of synthesis in response to tighter controls on the supply chain, particularly under the new Trump administration taking office in 2025. As a result, Mexican criminal organizations may increasingly target more accessible markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, where synthetic drugs like tusi (pink cocaine), MDMA, and ketamine already have a stable demand.
Additionally, the inauguration of the Chancay megaport in Peru in November 2024 has raised regional security concerns over a potential surge in synthetic drug trafficking. More than 80% of the precursors used in South America for the production of fentanyl and methamphetamine originate in China, increasing the likelihood that these substances could enter via Chancay under the protection of the Chinese state and with limited external oversight—mirroring the opacity surrounding the Chinese space station located in Neuquén, Argentina.
“Following the inauguration of the Chancay megaport in Peru, […] over 80% of the chemical precursors used in South America to produce fentanyl and methamphetamine come from China, increasing the likelihood of entry through Chancay under Chinese state protection.”
In conclusion, although fentanyl consumption has yet to reach critical levels across Latin America, the threat of an emerging opioid market raises ongoing concerns for regional security. The convergence of transnational criminal networks, the adaptive capacity of Mexican cartels in response to new controls, and the reinforcement of port infrastructure—such as the Chancay megaport—create favorable conditions for an increase in precursor trafficking from China. In this context, the region faces increasingly complex security challenges that may test the institutional capacity of Latin American states to confront a crisis of this magnitude.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES