The Diplomatic Chess Between China and Guatemala
Taiwan’s allies in Latin America can be counted on the fingers of one hand: Paraguay, Belize, and Guatemala. They are not major powers in the region, but they share a strong bond and a long history of relations with the island of Taiwan. However, the mere fact of having a rapprochement with Taiwan is reason enough to have diplomatic clashes with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
At the end of May, Chinese authorities held several shipments of coffee and macadamia from Guatemala without offering an apparent explanation, something that experts and local media claim was retaliation for Guatemala’s close relationship with Taiwan.
Ten days prior, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Carlos Ramiro Martínez, was present at the inauguration of the new Taiwanese president, Lai Ching Te – who, that same May 20, also held a virtual meeting with Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo.
The Guatemalan exporters’ union denounced the withholding of their products by the Chinese authorities, and the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Wang Wenbin, criticized the Central American country for maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and urged the Guatemalan authorities to instead move closer to Beijing.
Wenbin told the AFP news agency that he “hopes” Guatemalan leaders “will make the right decision, and soon, for the benefit of their people”.
In the past eight years, Taiwan has lost at least 10 of its international allies, leaving it with only 12 partners globally, among which Guatemala and Paraguay are among the most prominent.
Guatemala, however, maintains its firm stance of support for Taiwan, but the Arevalo administration – which took office in January – also confessed to seeking closer ties with Beijing.
“We are going to continue working with Taiwan at the levels we have been doing, but the president has pointed out that we cannot ignore the weight and power that China represents,” Guatemalan Foreign Minister Martinez said in an interview with Reuters in February this year.
“We are interested in approaching them to try to develop some relationship around trade,” said Martinez, stating that this could be reflected in the establishment of an “office of trade interests” to facilitate access of Guatemalan products to the Chinese market. However, Martinez assured that this position is not “an ambush against Taiwan”.
Guatemala’s position reflects the complex geopolitical reality of maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan while seeking commercial proximity with China. This delicate democratic balancing act is being carried out under the watchful eye of China, in a regional context largely aligned with Beijing.
China’s recent blockade of Guatemalan cargo is not the first dispute between the two countries in recent times. In April 2023, China lashed out at then Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei for his visit to Taiwan.
At that time, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused Guatemala of “aiding the tyrant” and claimed the Giammattei government was acting in defense of “its own selfish interests” and against the wishes of the Guatemalan people.
The actions and recommendations of the Chinese authorities have not yet generated an official reaction or statement from Arevalo’s presidency – and the shipment remains stranded in Chinese territory. According to Guatemalan business organizations, the lack of exports of these two products – coffee and macadamia – throughout the year would result in a loss of US$30 million in revenues.
The Chinese narrative in this regard is clear evidence of the forms of pressure Beijing exerts on Taiwan’s allies with the intention of getting them to switch sides. And it is something that is already finding its way into Guatemalan media circles, adding more external pressure on Arevalo’s government.
Journalist Claudia Menéndez of the influential outlet Con Criterio criticized Foreign Minister Martínez for attending the Taiwanese president’s inauguration, claiming that his trip violated the One China principle – something Guatemala does not subscribe to as it has no official diplomatic relations with China.
Menéndez recently visited China on a trip funded by the Chinese government and, as a result, is now expected to publicly promote Beijing’s agenda.
Chinese companies such as Huawei and Lenovo are also increasing their commercial presence in Guatemala and acting as lobbyists. Huawei has attempted to commercialize its technologies, and made significant donations to the Giammattei government. However, President Arevalo has thus far rejected similar offers from Huawei due to concerns about the company and digital vulnerabilities.
Honduras and Panama are two cases where the change of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC was negotiated behind the scenes and was only publicly notified once it had already materialized, giving the Taiwanese just a few days to leave the country. In both cases, it was a disaster.
While Arevalo has shown no signs of a potential change of position (current Honduran President Xiomara Castro said during the election campaign that she would not change her position on Taiwan, and even had high-level Taiwanese delegates at her inauguration), a similar secret negotiation is not out of the question in the case of Guatemala.
Guatemala’s trade relations with China, while growing, face limitations due to the lack of formal agreements between the two countries – something that can lead to administrative barriers and regulatory challenges for both Guatemalan and Chinese companies. However, trade remains significant and shows mutual interest in maintaining and developing these ties.
In 2023, Guatemala exported US$82 million to China, while imports from China reached US$4.1 billion. Between January and April 2024, Guatemala has exported US$21.1 million to China and imported US$1.4 billion – significant figures.
On the other hand, in 2023 Guatemala exported around US$112 million to Taiwan – with whom it has had a free trade agreement since 2006 – while imports from Taiwan were US$227.3 million last year. Between January and April 2024, Guatemalan exports to Taiwan reached US$33.3 million and imports totaled US$53.4 million.
However, according to The Diplomat, Arévalo’s government also faces domestic and internal pressure to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.
In a recent article, The Diplomat claims that members of Arevalo’s own party, the Movimiento Semilla, believe that recognizing Beijing could bring them greater support in Congress, where they are in the minority. Meanwhile, the right-wing opposition and certain Guatemalan elites, dissatisfied with US pressure, see China as a way to counter future US-backed actions.
The future of Guatemala’s relations with Taiwan and China will depend largely on the evolution of foreign policy under the Arévalo administration and its successors. While the current posture is clear, international and regional dynamics could change, influencing future decisions.
In the short term, Guatemala is likely to continue to benefit from Taiwan’s assistance and support. However, as China’s economic influence continues to grow, Guatemala may need to reevaluate its posture.
“The Taiwan issue” would not be of such concern if the U.S. stopped supporting and advocating recognition of Taiwan to provide a regional counterweight to the PRC. It is no coincidence that the last bastion of countries that still recognize Taiwan are in the Caribbean.
Relations with Taiwan give Guatemala – a smaller, poorer country regionally overshadowed by its neighbors with ties to Beijing – the respect it values. Simply put, for Taiwan, Guatemala is important and demonstrates this by acting as a good partner. However, to China, Guatemala – like any other country that favors Taiwan – is only relevant in order for the PRC to weaken Taiwan.
Guatemala’s relationship with Taiwan offers material benefits; although they have a clear limit and may be much smaller than potential Chinese investments and loans. For a small country, the chances of being recognized as a relevant international player are slim, and therefore the status offered by Taiwan may be attractive to smaller countries.
Therefore, since Taiwan knows that it cannot count on diplomatic recognition from the major powers, it seeks status among the small countries and pays close attention to its remaining allies.
The key for Guatemala will be to find a balance that maximizes economic and diplomatic benefits without compromising its principles.
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