Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges

Photo: Palácio do Planalto.

According to a report by the newspaper El Tiempo, during the “China-CELAC Forum,” the president of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, proposed a closer relationship and increased cooperation with the Caribbean and Latin American region.

This proposal is framed within a global context of geopolitical confrontation between the Asian country and the United States, demonstrating China’s intention to continue developing its political and economic cooperation with Caribbean and Latin American countries.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was established in 2013 with the purpose of fostering connectivity between China and countries that signed the memorandum of understanding. This connectivity was intended to be achieved through infrastructure, energy, port, and railway projects, which raised expectations but also generated criticism.

To date, at least 150 nations worldwide have signed the cooperation agreement under the BRI framework, including at least 20 located in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Regarding this, Ulf Thoene, professor at Universidad de La Sabana and expert in China–Latin America relations, stated that “In the current context, some see the Belt and Road not only as an economic opportunity, but as a defensive strategy in response to tightened trade relations with Washington.”

The academic also mentioned that the main criticisms against this initiative relate to the lack of transparency in contracts, the negative impact on local job creation and training, potential loss of sovereignty, and the asymmetrical nature of relations with China, in which, in some cases, agreements have disadvantaged China’s partner states.

In addition, some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and international bodies have raised concerns about the social and environmental challenges linked to the initiative. These include infrastructure projects carried out without environmental impact assessments or the construction of dams that have led to the displacement of Indigenous communities, resulting in negative effects in certain countries in the region.

On the other hand, political scientist Natalia Tobón, partner at Cárdenas Tobón and former director of ProColombia in China, stated that “The risks attributed to participation in the BRI, such as excessive debt or loss of sovereignty, are often overstated or misunderstood.”

Tobón emphasized that the Belt and Road Initiative does not entail legal obligations or binding agreements under international law for the countries that sign the cooperation framework or memorandum of understanding. Instead, it primarily serves as a cooperation framework that facilitates project implementation between China and the signatory nations, based on terms agreed upon by the receiving countries, always from a sovereign perspective.

Meanwhile, Parsifal D’Sola, executive director and founder of the Andrés Bello Foundation – China–Latin America Research Center, noted that “The main risk for any country joining the Belt and Road Initiative is a lack of preparation.”

He added that “Given the asymmetrical relationship with China, having no foreign policy framework to interact with Beijing is the worst approach a country can take.”

In fact, there is differential treatment among countries within the initiative. For example, Greece, due to its key geostrategic position, has received significant port investments such as the case of the Port of Piraeus, managed by the company COSCO. In contrast, other countries are treated primarily as suppliers of raw materials rather than long-term partners, revealing asymmetries in the terms of each agreement.

Regarding the withdrawal from the BRI by countries such as Panama and Italy, D’Sola mentioned that “In the case of Italy, the decision was geopolitical and strategic, influenced by pressure from its Western allies, the lack of economic results (China’s trade surplus with Italy grew instead of shrinking), and a shift in ideological orientation between the governments of Giuseppe Conte and Giorgia Meloni.”

As for Panama, D’Sola indicated that the country exited the initiative due to pressure from the United States government, which led Panama to decide not to renew its participation in the BRI.

D’Sola noted that there are illustrative cases worth analyzing in the Latin American context, such as Venezuela, Chile, Peru, and Argentina. These countries signed the memorandum of understanding with clear investment goals in strategic sectors, but the outcomes vary significantly between them.

According to D’Sola, “In Venezuela, the results have been disastrous; in Peru, mixed; and in Chile, successful. This suggests that the success or failure of participation depends more on the quality of project planning and execution, as well as local contexts and decision-making, than on China’s demands.”

According to El Tiempo, in the Peruvian case, the Chancay megaport stands out as a planned hub for maritime connectivity between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries. In Chile’s case, China has become its most important trading partner due to Chinese imports of copper, wine, and fruits from Chile. This relationship has occurred without corruption scandals or debt issues.

In contrast, according to Professor Thoene, “Venezuela has maintained a relationship focused mainly on oil financing, with no significant progress in infrastructure or technological transparency, and has remained indebted for over a decade.”

For her part, political scientist Natalia Tobón emphasized that “Far from being a threat, the Belt and Road Initiative could become a tool for strengthening Latin American industry.”

In the Latin American context, China is considered the most important trading partner for three countries: Brazil, Chile, and Peru. In the latter two, several investments have been made under the BRI framework.

In the same vein, it is worth highlighting what Chinese president Xi Jinping stated: in 2024, trade between China and CELAC countries exceeded $500 billion, a figure 40 times higher than at the beginning of the 21st century.

Additionally, in that same statement, Xi committed to building a China–Latin America community with a shared future and announced the creation of a fund of approximately $9.2 billion in credit lines for regional development.

He also proposed enhancing cooperation in key sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, the digital economy, and mining. He suggested establishing joint training programs and efforts to combat terrorism and organized crime to achieve global peace.

In response, Germán Ortiz, professor at Universidad del Rosario, commented that this reflects the geopolitical ambition of the People’s Republic of China, pointing out that there is “a Global South with infrastructure deficiencies and limited financial resources, and a major country with commercial interests, capital to invest, and powerful state-owned enterprises willing to intervene. Under these conditions, China is positioned to consolidate a level of influence in Latin America that few could have previously imagined.”

Main Source:

Franja y Ruta: lo que enseñan Chile y Venezuela sobre cómo debe Colombia negociar acuerdo con China – El Tiempo

Related News:

Colombia signs a cooperation plan for the Belt and Road Initiative

Possible Colombian accession to the Belt and Road Initiative sparks tensions in foreign policy

Venezuelan Vice President Urges Chinese Government to Increase Imports of Venezuelan Oil

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